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 NIO/PE, NIO/USSR, NIO/WE, OALA/ME/LA, OALA/MIL, D/OCR-3, ODPH-H,
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FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2964

INFO RUFHUU/NATO COLLECTIVE

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BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L BONN 00153 COMBINED SECTION

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 01-05-2001 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) OR-M

TAGS: PL, GE

SUBJECT: POLAND: UPDATING MEASURES -- THE FRG

REFS: (A) BONN 61 (NOTAL)

- (B) 81 BONN 25339 (NOTAL)

- (C) 81 BONN 25338 (NOTAL)

- (D) BONN 60 (NOTAL)

- (E) STATE 218

1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

State Dept. review completed

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SINCE OUR LAST APPRAISALS (REFTELS) AT THE END OF DECEMBER FRG ATTITUDES TOWARD THE POLISH CRISIS HAVE CONSOLIDATED AND SHIFTED ONLY SLIGHTLY TOWARD POSITIONS MORE FAVORABLE TO OURS. FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER HAS, FOR EXAMPLE, PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED THE SOVIET RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHAT HAPPENS IN POLAND AND HAS EMPHASIZED THE COMMONALITY OF WESTERN AND U.S. OBJECTIVES. AT THE SAME TIME, THE FRG HAS PURSUED AN ACTIVE POLICY (THE RAKOWSKI VISIT, CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S LETTERS TO BREZHNEV AND JARUZELSKI, AND EC CONSENSUS-BUILDING) WHICH IT CAN PORTRAY AS CONSTRUCTIVE AND POSITIVE AND WHICH IT TENDS TO USE AS A BOLSTER FOR CONTINUING TO ESCHUE A POLICY OF SANCTIONS. PUBLIC AND MEDIA CONTROVERSY OVER THE SANCTIONS ISSUE AND THE FRG ROLE VIS-A-VIS THE U.S. CONTINUES, BUT THE SENSE OF CAUTION STILL PREVAILS. FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER HAS GONE PUBLIC WITH HIS CALL FOR "SIGNALS" FROM THE POLISH REGIME IN RESPONSE TO HIS "THREE EXPECTATIONS":

-- RELEASE OF THE INTERNEES, TERMINATION OF MARTIAL LAW, AND RESUMPTION OF DIALOGUE WITH THE CHURCH AND SOLIDARITY. THESE "EXPECTATIONS" ARE ROOTED IN THE BUNDESTAG RESOLUTION OF DECEMBER 18, WHICH FRG OFFICIALS ARE CITING AS THE BASIS OF POLICY.

3. WE DOUBT THAT BONN WILL SOON ALTER ITS POLICY SIGNIFICANTLY, BUT IT MAY COME UNDER PRESSURE TO DO SO IF THE POLISH REGIME FAILS TO OBLIGE WITH THE DESIRED SIGNALS. OUR APPROACH FOR NOW SHOULD (AS OUTLINED IN REFS A AND B) BE TO INSIST THAT THE FRG NOT CONTRAVENE OR CONTRADICT OUR BROADER EFFORTS AT COMPELLING THE POLISH REGIME TO HOLD TO ITS PROMISES. WE COULD ALSO STRESS THE COMPLEMENTARITY OF OUR STICK AND BONN'S CARROT APPROACH AND THE NEED FOR CLOSE COORDINATION IF EITHER IS TO BE EFFECTIVE. FINALLY, ALTHOUGH AFTER THE JANUARY 4 EC MINISTERIAL IT NOW APPEARS LESS LIKELY THAT BONN WILL ENCOUNTER UNBEARABLE CRITICISM FROM ITS EC ALLIES, WE SHOULD TRY TO CAPITALIZE ON ANY OPPORTUNITIES THAT MIGHT ARISE TO BUILD SUPPORT FOR TOUGHER POSITIONS AMONG BONN'S EUROPEAN PARTNERS IN HOPES THEY CAN BRING THE GERMANS ALONG.

END SUMMARY.

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4. PUBLIC POSTURE

AS NOTED REFTELS, THE OFFICIAL FRG PUBLIC POSTURE ON POLAND HAS BEEN ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY DECLARATORY IN NATURE, BASED ON THE EVIDENT ASSUMPTION THAT STRONGER MEASURES WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE WITHIN POLAND AND AT THE SAME TIME HARMFUL TO FRG POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS. IN RECENT DAYS, THERE HAS BEEN SOME OFFICIAL MOVEMENT AWAY FROM GOVERNMENT PRESS SPOKESMAN BECKER'S DECEMBER 30 STATEMENT (THAT THE FRG "DOES NOT SHARE THE VIEW" THAT THE USSR INSTIGATED MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND); IN BRUSSELS ON JANUARY 4, FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER DECLARED THAT "THE SOVIET UNION BEARS A RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE EVENTS IN POLAND."

5. MEDIA

NEWSPAPERS BELONGING TO THE CONSERVATIVE SPRINGER CHAIN (DIE WELT, WELT AM SONNTAG, BILD, ETC.), AS WELL AS THE INDEPENDENT, PRESTIGIOUS FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG.

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HAVE BEEN CONSISTENTLY CRITICAL OF WHAT THEY PERCEIVE TO BE AN EXCESSIVELY CAUTIOUS IF NOT COMPLIANT ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT. THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND NEWSPAPERS CLOSE TO THE GOVERNMENT PARTIES HAVE FOLLOWED THE LINE ESPOUSED BY THE SPD/FDP COALITION.

6. CRITICISM OF THE U.S. DECISIONS REGARDING SANCTIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION AND POLAND IS USUALLY COUPLED WITH REFERENCES TO "A MORAL DOUBLE STANDARD" BEING APPLIED BY THE U.S. IN DEALING WITH VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND POLAND, ON THE ONE HAND, AND WITH TURKEY, CHILE, SOUTH AFRICA, CENTRAL AMERICA, ON THE OTHER. MEDIA CRITICAL OF THE U.S. POSITION ALSO SUPPORT THE FRG GOVERNMENT'S ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESENT POLISH SITUATION AS A PURELY POLISH AFFAIR (THE "LAST

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POLISH CARD" BEING PLAYED OUT TO AVERT SOVIET INTERVENTION), THAT JARUZELSKI IS A POLISH PATRIOT COMMITTED TO THE CONTINUATION OF THE REFORM AND RENEWAL PROCESS, AND THAT HE NEEDS ALL THE HELP HE CAN GET IF HE IS TO SUCCEED.

7. OTHERS (E.G. "SPIEGEL" PUBLISHER RUDOLF AUGSTEIN'S EDITORIAL IN THE JANUARY 4 ISSUE OF THAT MAGAZINE) POINT TO ROOSEVELT AS BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR "HANDING OVER POLAND" TO THE SOVIETS AT YALTA; THEY MAINTAIN THAT A ROLL-BACK POLICY NOW WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO COURTING OPEN CONFLICT. THE "YALTA" ARGUMENT IS LIKELY TO BE USED MORE FREQUENTLY IN THE FUTURE IN DEFENDING THE FRG POSITION ON "NOT ROCKING THE BOAT."

8. ALL THIS IS INTERLarded WITH REFLECTIONS ABOUT THE HISTORICAL INEFFICIENCY OF SANCTIONS. BUT ONE GETS THE FEELING THAT MANY OF THESE COMMENTS ARE SO AGGRESSIVELY DEFENSIVE OF THE FRG POSITION BECAUSE THERE MAY BE A PERHAPS SUBCONSCIOUS RECOGNITION THAT THE GERMAN PEOPLE AT LARGE ARE NOT COMFORTABLE WITH THE VARIOUS FORMS OF RATIONALIZATION THEY ARE BEING OFFERED BY THEIR GOVERNMENT. (COMMENT: MEDIA QUOTES SUPPORTING THIS ASSESSMENT OF THE PUBLIC MOOD HAVE BEEN AND ARE BEING TRANSMITTED VIA DAILY USICA BONN MEDIA REACTION REPORTING. END COMMENT)

9. ATTITUDE TOWARDS OUR MEASURES AGAINST POLAND AND THE

SOVIET UNION

THE U.S. REQUEST FOR PARALLEL STEPS BY THE ALLIES COMPARABLE TO U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION AND POLAND HAS CREATED A STORM OF DEBATE IN GERMANY. AS EXPECTED, THE INITIAL REACTION OF THE FRG - WITH BOTH THE REMNANTS OF DETENTE AND CONSIDERABLE ECONOMIC INTERESTS POTENTIALLY AT RISK - WAS NEGATIVE. ECONOMIC MINISTER LAMBRDORFF WAS PERHAPS THE SHARPEST

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CRITIC WHEN IN A NEWSPAPER INTERVIEW HE QUESTIONED THE MOTIVES BEHIND U.S. SANCTIONS. HE ARGUED THAT U.S., BY ALLOWING ITS GRAIN SALES TO GO FORWARD, WAS EXEMPTING ITS MOST IMPORTANT TRADE ITEMS FROM RESTRICTIONS, WHILE URGING EUROPEANS TO TAKE RESTRICTIVE MEASURES AGAINST THEIR MOST IMPORTANT TRADE ITEMS. THE FAMILIAR THEME, HEARD AFTER AFGHANISTAN, THAT ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE AN IMPRECISE AND INEFFECTIVE POLITICAL TOOL WAS RESTATED BY FRG OFFICIALS AND GERMAN INDUSTRY SPOKESMEN SUCH AS WOLFF VON AMERONGEN. REPRESENTATIVES OF GERMAN INDUSTRIES THAT WOULD BE DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY ECONOMIC SANCTIONS - SUCH AS FIRMS INVOLVED IN THE SIBERIAN PIPELINE - WERE ALSO QUICK TO PROTEST THE U.S. MEASURES.

10. NEVERTHELESS, THE GERMAN REACTION TO THE SANCTIONS POLICY IS EMBRYONIC, AND THE FRG IS STILL IN THE EARLY STAGES OF ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF PARALLELLING U.S. SANCTIONS WHILE CLOSELY WATCHING THE REACTIONS OF ITS EC PARTNERS. SEVERAL EXCELLENT EDITORIALS IN THE FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG AND HANDELSBLATT, JOURNALS HIGHLY INFLUENTIAL IN GERMAN BUSINESS CIRCLES, HAVE RIGHTLY FOCUSED ON THE SANCTIONS ISSUE AS A KEY TEST OF GERMAN RELATIONSHIP TO THE ALLIANCE AND HAVE CRITICIZED PRESENTLY TIMID FRG STANCE. PRELIMINARY EMBASSY CONTACTS WITH INDUSTRY REPRESENTATIVES EVINCES A GREATER DEGREE OF UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT FOR SANCTIONS MEASURES THAN IS EVIDENT IN OFFICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS TO DATE.

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11. DIVERGENCES

WHILE THE CDU/CSU OPPOSITION HAS PREDICTABLY LEVELED STRONG VERBAL FIRE ON THE SCHMIDT/GENSCHER GOVERNMENT, AND SEVERAL OPPOSITION POLITICIANS (NOTABLY ALOIS MERTES AND NORBERT BLUEM) HAVE STRESSED MOSCOW'S ROLE IN THE POLISH EVENTS, THE OPPOSITION HAS NOT TAKEN A POSITION OF EXPLICIT SUPPORT FOR A POLICY OF SANCTIONS, AND THERE

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IS NO INDICATION IT PLANS TO DO SO. INSTEAD, THE CDU/CSU HAS STRESSED THE JOINT GOVERNMENT-OPPOSITION BUNDESTAG RESOLUTION ON POLAND OF DECEMBER 18 (81 BONN 25097), WHICH DOES NOT GO BEYOND URGING THAT THE GOVERNMENT "SUSPEND" GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO POLAND AS LONG AS THE "MEASURE OF SUPPRESSION" CONTINUES.

12. ANOTHER POTENTIAL SOURCE OF PRESSURE FOR A TOUGH STAND ON POLAND IS THE POWERFUL GERMAN LABOR FEDERATION (DGB). YET, IT IS SO FAR FOLLOWING THE CAUTIOUS OUTLOOK OF THE POLITICAL-ECONOMIC ESTABLISHMENT FOR REASONS OUTLINED IN REF D.

STEPS WE SHOULD TAKE

WE DO NOT FORESEE SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN FRG CAUTION OVER THE NEXT WEEK OR SO, PARTICULARLY IF THE SITUATION IN POLAND CONTINUES A SLOW RETURN TO "NORMAL." CONTINUED FAILURE OF THE POLISH REGIME TO PROVIDE CONVINCING SIGNALS OF AN INTENTION TO RETURN TO THE PRE-DECEMBER 13 REFORM COURSE COULD PRODUCE PRESSURES ON THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR TOUGHER ACTION, BUT IT IS PROBABLY TOO EARLY FOR THAT NOW.

13. IF THE POLISH REGIME DOES NOT SOON PRODUCE THE "SIGNALS" GENSCHER WANTS, THEN WE COULD BEGIN TO PRESS THE FRG ON THIS POINT. ADDITIONALLY, WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE ALERT TO POTENTIAL PRESSURE THAT MIGHT BE BROUGHT TO BEAR UPON THE FRG BY ITS LESS PATIENT EUROPEAN PARTNERS. WE SHOULD ALSO TAKE CARE TO REASSURE THE FRG THAT FIRM ACTION AGAINST THE POLISH REGIME OR THE SOVIET UNION NEED NOT JEOPARDIZE RESOLUTION OF SUCH CRITICAL EAST-WEST ISSUES AS ARMS CONTROL. AT THE LEAST, WE SHOULD INSIST THAT THE FRG RESPECT THE NEED FOR COMPLEMENTARITY OF ACTIONS IF WE ARE TO OBTAIN OUR SHARED OBJECTIVE OF PERSUADING THE POLISH REGIME TO STOP ITS REPRESSION AND THAT, ACCORDINGLY, THE FRG SHOULD NOT UNDERMINE OUR ACTIONS IF IT CANNOT JOIN THEM.

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14. AS THE DEBATE ON SANCTIONS DEVELOPS IN GERMANY, WE WOULD ALSO ADVISE U.S. OFFICIALS TO KEEP THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN MIND IN THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS:

-- THE GERMANS WILL BALK AT AN OPEN ENDED COMMITMENT TO SANCTIONS. WE SHOULD STRESS BOTH THE LIMITED NATURE OF THE SANCTIONS AND THE OBJECTIVES WE WISH TO ACHIEVE THEREBY.

-- WE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO DEFUSE THE ARGUMENT THAT THE U.S. IS ASKING MORE OF THE FRG THAN IT IS WILLING TO DO ITSELF BY QUANTIFYING IN SO FAR AS POSSIBLE THE ECONOMIC SACRIFICE THE U.S. IS ASSUMING THROUGH SANCTIONS. IN COMPARING U.S. AND FRG TRADE WITH THE SOVIETS, THE BASE YEAR THAT SHOULD BE CHOSEN IS PRE-AFGHANISTAN 1979 (WHEN U.S. AND FRG EXPORTS TO USSR WERE ABOUT EQUAL) RATHER THAN 1981.

-- WE SHOULD STRESS U.S. CONSULTATIONS, BOTH BILATERALLY AND WITHIN NATO. SOME OTHERWISE SYMPATHETIC GERMAN INDUSTRY REPRESENTATIVES HAVE OBSERVED THAT U.S. CALLS TO JOIN IN SANCTIONS SHOULD NOT APPEAR AS A DIKTAT; FINALLY

-- WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON OTHER EUROPEANS FIRST. THIS WILL AVOID THE CRITICISM THAT IS ESPECIALLY UNCOMFORTABLE TO THE PRESENT COALITION THAT THE U.S. TREATS THE FRG AS ITS EUROPEAN VASSAL, AND IT MIGHT MAKE THE FRG MORE CONSCIOUS OF THE DANGER OF ISOLATION WITHIN EUROPE. WOESSNER

END OF MESSAGE

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